us to meet their need is less forceful than the demands on us to meet someone else's need that is not self-caused.
A central aspect of Glannon's (2009) account, which is meant to serve as the connection between causal and moral responsibility, is what he identifies as a moral obligation to not contribute to the competition for scarce medical resources. The person that is causally responsible for their ARESLD and meets the above epistemic conditions is "morally responsible because, by having but failing to exercise control over their behavior, they acted negligently and failed to discharge a duty that we owe to others in society. This is the duty to act in such a way as not to increase competition for a scarce life-saving resource. That ARESLD is a preventable outcome for which one can be causally and morally responsible is a reasonable social expectation. It is based on the idea that most of us are capable of acting voluntarily and of knowing the causal connection between chronic drinking and liver failure" (24).
Not acting appropriately in the face of sufficient knowledge makes one morally culpable. For Glannon, a person is morally responsible for their ARESLD when that person is causally responsible (i.e. that person could have done otherwise) for being in that disease state, and failed to act on their knowledge that their behavior could have the consequences that it ended up having (i.e. have met the epistemic conditions outlined above, but did not alter their behavior in light of that knowledge) (25). For Glannon, this means that the individual is being "negligent", and it is this negligence that connects causal responsibility to moral responsibility, and justifies giving them lower priority for access. This, in a nutshell, is the standard view of justified lower priority for ARESLD patients, defended by philosophers such as Brudney (2007) and Glannon (2009) . 1 As argued for in the remainder of this paper, there are serious practical and theoretical problems with this sort of strategy for attempting to justify giving people that have caused their ARESLD lower priority for access to transplantable livers. This is not to conclude that we can never be justified in giving such people lower priority, but rather that standard arguments for this position as they are currently articulated in the literature are incomplete in important ways, and thus different grounds for this justification are required.
Have the causal and epistemic conditions been met?
The first challenge to this standard approach to justifying lower priority is a practical one, having to do with determining whether someone meets the causal and epistemic conditions, which needs to be done in order to know whether we are justified in giving that person a lower priority. Not being able to assess whether specific conditions hold in practice would be a significant barrier to reliably and fairly implementing this framework in practice. (There are also theoretical problems with such views, which I discuss later in the paper).
Part of the trick is to determine whether someone should have known that (e.g.) their behavior could potentially result in someone else dying in the future. To a significant extent, this is an empirical issue, about whether there is sufficient public awareness about the relevant facts (e.g. the conditions on access to transplantable organs in one's country, the current scarcity of organs available for transplantation, etc.). Barring the availability of such empirical evidence about public awareness of alcoholism and the organ shortage problem (among other things), we are left with speculative judgments about what it is reasonable to expect of others to have known. For example, including information on the labels on alcoholic beverages warning of the effects of drinking while pregnant is to make this information available to consumers of such alcoholic beverages (although it may not always be available if the alcohol is purchased in a pub or restaurant). But, the question is then about the extent to which we can reasonably expect that all those that consume those beverages will have read and understood those labels (and are literate), and, importantly, the extent to which this initiative is sufficient to establish the necessary degree of awareness of the potential consequences of one's drinking behaviour. It very well may be; but this needs to be demonstrated.
The issue is complicated by the fact that medical professionals/transplant teams would need to be able to determine (and not just assume) whether the causal and epistemic conditions have been met, for each particular individual. It is very difficult in practice to gather reliable and detailed information about a patient's (non-medical) history of the sort required to know whether they (e.g.) began drinking heavily when they were 9 or 11 or 14 or 22, whether they were aware that there was an acute organ shortage problem in their country (at a time prior to being addicted to alcohol), whether they had the foresight to anticipate that someone else could die in the future because of their drinking behavior, whether events in that person's life had sufficient force on their behavior (in the past) to say whether or not that person was sufficiently in control of their self and their resulting behaviour, etc. In short, there is reason to be skeptical about whether medical professionals/transplant teams could have the resources, time and detail requisite for making accurate assessments about whether particular patients meet the causal and epistemic conditions, on a case by case basis. If medical professionals/transplant teams do not have the requisite resources, then even if there are no principled reasons against putting nonmedical conditions on access to medical resources, time-constrained and resource-depraved medical professionals ought to restrict their attention to medical information when making decisions about allocation of scarce transplantable livers.
The same difficulties are not attached to assessing or making judgments on medical information about the patients, in part because medical professionals will typically have the resources necessary for determining current health status of the patients, and their likely prognosis and long term health concerns. While there may be difficulties in guaranteeing accuracy in the assessment of (even) medical information about the patients, patients' medical information is more easily empirically verified (and thus doing so does not rely on patient cooperation and honest disclosure), is something that medical professionals are expertly trained in understanding and assessing, and making such medical judgments does not depend on making (moral) judgments about desert or the character of patients-judgments about aspects of the patients that medical professionals do not have any particular expertise.
Perhaps this difficulty of assessing matters on a case by case basis could be overcome if we were to establish general thresholds for access (e.g. age of onset of alcoholism, before which one is not morally responsible and after which one is morally responsible), that would not require us to have as much detail about the patient's non-medical history available for analysis.
However, if the expected long term health outcome is the same between a person with ESLD and a person with ARESLD, it is not justifiable to appeal to general rules of thumb or establishing general thresholds for causal/moral responsibility. Giving those with ARESLD lower priority is justified only if they are causally responsible and meet the epistemic conditions, and not justified based on their membership in a certain age group (or the like). This is to say that such general guidelines would still find us confronting the difficulties noted above about case by case assessment, since we could not be justified in merely assuming that everyone that began drinking after the age of x is causally responsible for their ARESLD and met the corresponding epistemic conditions. Perhaps these practical issues could be resolved. However, even if such practical hurdles could be overcome, there are other, more serious, problems with this general strategy for determining fair prioritization of livers.
A moral duty to not increase competition for scarce medical resources?
As discussed earlier, a central aspect of Glannon's argument is that we all have a duty to not willingly, avoidably increase the competition for "absolutely" scarce medical resources, like human livers. Yet, Glannon's discussion of the epistemic conditions does not include an acknowledgment that it is not enough that such a moral obligation exists (if it does exist). We would also need to show that the agent must be reasonably assumed to be aware of this moral obligation that they have (just as they need to be aware that e.g. alcohol consumption could lead to ARESLD). Thus, if Glannon is correct, then the list of epistemic conditions included above would need to be expanded, to include knowledge of this moral obligation on each of us to not contribute to the competition for scarce medical resources. Just like we would be unjustified in giving an individual from an isolated community that was first introduced to alcohol and unaware of the long term effects a lower priority for transplantable livers, if this moral duty is to play a role in decision making about allocation, then individuals would need to know that they have such a moral duty.
Is it true that people can be reasonably assumed to be aware that they have a moral duty not to increase competition for scarce medical resources? I suspect that most people are not aware of this moral duty that they have-although this is an empirical question-even if they have a sense that harming others is wrong. At the very least, it seems plausible to suggest that they are less likely to meet this epistemic condition than they are to meet the ones regarding the effects of alcohol consumption on liver functioning and the current scarcity of transplantable livers. And recent empirical data suggests that public awareness of the relationship between alcohol consumption and liver disease, cancer, and fetal alcohol syndrome, for example, is surprisingly low (e.g. Burham et al. 2014; Bowden et al. 2014; Sanderson et al. 2009 ). None of this means that no such moral duty exists. But, my point here is not (yet) about whether such a duty exists, but rather whether people can be reasonably expected to have been aware of this moral obligation on them at the time that they began the causal history of their end stage liver disease. There is some indication that general public awareness of this moral duty is not high at all.
It is worth noting that this is not an inherent problem with the project of giving lower priority to individuals that have failed to meet this moral duty (if it exists). If there is a lack of public awareness of this moral duty, this could be remedied, over time, by increasing public awareness of this duty, and its connection to allocation of scarce transplantable livers-perhaps we could redesign the labels on alcoholic beverages to include a statement of this moral duty.
But, if there is a current lack of awareness of this moral duty, and this moral duty is to play a role in decision making about access to transplantable livers, then it is (currently) unjustified to give lower priority for this reason in the face of such a lack of awareness.
Furthermore, assuming that a moral obligation not to increase the competition for scarce life-saving resources exists, it is important to ask about its nature and scope. People contribute to the competition for absolutely scarce life-saving resources (and scarce medical resources in general) all the time and in many different ways. Many of these ways are not obviously morally unacceptable. For example, bringing new children into existence is an activity that in obvious and unavoidable ways contributes to the competition for scarce medical resources, at least because there are now more people in the world competing for those resources. Another example is the class of voluntary but risky behavior, which includes activities like driving cars on busy highways, rock climbing, boxing, and professional firefighting, etc. Another example of a contribution to the competition for scarce life-saving resources is the decision not to be a cadaveric organ donor. Perhaps the most telling example of an activity that is not immoral but which contributes to the competition for scarce medical resources is the invention/development of human organ transplant technology and immunosuppressant drugs, which make it possible for anyone to have access to safe and effective organ transplantations in the first place. One (collateral) implication of such inventions is that doing so has a very significant impact on increasing the number of people that are now in competition for the resources required for receiving successful organ transplants; the 'organ shortage problem' is only a problem because safe and effective organ transplantation technology is available. One of the major contributing factors to increasing the competition for absolutely scarce life-saving medical resources is the development of the technology that makes such life-saving a real possibility in the first place.
There is enough here to suggest that Glannon's proposed moral duty to not contribute to the competition for scarce life-saving resources is (far) too wide.
To distinguish between voluntarily causing oneself ARESLD, as an activity that contributes to the competition for scarce medical resources, from other activities (like the development of transplant technology or bringing new children into existence) that also contribute to the competition for scarce medical resources, perhaps Glannon could say something about the ways in which that duty is breached or unmet. Perhaps some ways of failing to meet this moral obligation are acceptable while others are unacceptable. But, of course, this needs to be argued for, and is not something included in Glannon's view as it stands.
As a first attempt, consider the following. One could increase the competition for scarce medical resources by (e.g.) stealing all but one of the dialysis machines in a particular hospital, leaving those that require dialysis to fight over access to the remaining machine. We might think that this is an unacceptable way of failing to meet one's moral obligation, in part because it seems to have an inherent maliciousness in intent. On the other hand, something like inventing dialysis technology or cyclosporine or the like may be to fail to meet one's moral obligation in an acceptable way, since the main motivation behind doing so is meant to be in line with benefiting people, rather than harming them. Thus, perhaps Glannon's account could be tweaked to make it clear that not all ways of breaching or failing to meet one's moral duty not to increase the competition for absolutely scarce life-saving medical resources are negligent (and thus not all of them are morally unacceptable), and that it is only the negligent ones that could ground our justifiably giving lower priority to access to those resources.
But then the question becomes whether voluntary alcohol consumption (that leads to ARESLD) is an unacceptable way of failing to meet one's moral obligation to not increase the competition for scarce medical resources. This strikes me as being a contentious claim, especially if we want to say that rock climbing, boxing, firefighting and not being a cadaveric organ donor are acceptable/not unacceptable ways of failing to meet this moral obligation.
Indeed, the sort of harm caused by the firefighter that requires a lung transplant and the alcoholic that requires a liver transplant are comparable.
It is important to note that there may be a way to get around this implication: Glannon could respond by agreeing that alcohol consumption is relevantly similar to boxing and rock climbing and firefighting, and that we ought to treat such like cases alike. This, of course, would mean that if we want to give lower priority to people that have caused their own ARESLD then we also need to give lower priority to those that have caused (e.g.) their own rock-climbing related end stage organ failure, and their own firefighting end stage lung disease, etc.
None of this is meant to suggest that we are unjustified in giving ARESLD people a lower priority than others that are not responsible for their ESLD or that are responsible for it for different reasons, but rather that basing such prioritization on appealing to a putative moral obligation to not contribute to the competition to scarce medical resources, as described by Glannon, is insufficient (as it stands) for establishing that justifiability.
Even if the scope of this moral duty can be reigned in (e.g. by consistently giving lower priority to rock climbers that need new organs because of the their rock climbing behavior, giving firefighters lower priority for lung transplants because of the hazards of their career choice, etc.), there is good reason to think that such a duty is an "imperfect" one, rather than a "perfect" one. It is impossible to never increase competition for scarce medical resources, especially if we take scarce medical resources to mean global medical resources (and not just domestic ones), and include all such resources, not just transplantable livers (or human organs and tissues in general). By choosing to remain alive, one will need food and clean drinking water, and these are scarce life-saving resources. Indeed, by seeking life-saving medical treatment that is in any way due to behavior that was avoidable at all, one seems to be breaching their moral duty not to contribute to the competition for scarce live-saving resources.
Because of this, we would then need an argument to show that any and all (unacceptable) failures to meet this duty are moral failures, or else distinguish between the ones that are the result of a moral failure and the ones that are not. More than this, if it is correct to think of this duty as imperfect, then we need a method for gauging whether a patient has fulfilled this moral obligation in other ways, even if they are failing to meet it in one or more ways as well; are they meeting their imperfect duty not to contribute to the competition for scarce life-saving resources on balance?
This duty being an imperfect one means that we are allowed, morally speaking, to sometimes do things that to some extent increase the competition for scarce medical resources, as long as we are not doing so in too many ways, or not mitigating the competition in other ways. But this means that there may not be anything special about ARESLD as a way of not meeting one's moral duty, given that it is impossible to never contribute to the competition for such resources. We can imagine, for example, that some people that have caused their own end stage liver disease may attempt to educate their children more fully about the consequences of poor health decisions, which could lead to them not becoming in need of organ transplants in the future (and thus their parents indirectly decreasing the competition for scarce medical resources in this way). Or the person that requires a liver transplant donating their heart or corneas after their death, thereby balancing out their overall impact on the competition for scarce medical resources. 2 Or perhaps people that bring new children into existence contribute to the competition for scarce medical resources, but also neutralize that increase to some extent, since those children (in theory) could also increase the number of organs available for donation in the future (if they take care of their organs and become registered organ donors, and die in a way that allows for their organs to be harvested, say).
To return to an earlier point about practicality: whether or not someone is satisfying their imperfect moral duty overall may be quite difficult to determine in practice, on a case by case basis. This means that it would be very difficult to determine whether we are justified in giving a particular individual a lower priority for a transplantable liver, even if we could show that they are causally responsible and have met the epistemic conditions; establishing moral responsibility requires that we determine whether she has on balance failed to meet her moral obligation to not increase the competition for scarce life-saving medical resources (negligently).
If we cannot demonstrate the moral failing of the ARESLD person, then we have not answered the question about why she deserves lower priority. As discussed below, there may be other ways to flesh out this moral connection. But, it is clear at this point that Glannon's appeal to a moral obligation to not contribute to the competition for scarce medical resources faces difficult philosophical and practical issues, and thus is inadequate (as it stands) for establishing a basis lower priority since only wicked people would actually ask for one of the available livers (under those conditions) in the first place.
While I am sympathetic to this way of understanding things in this context, there are problems with this way of capturing the moral duty not to increase the competition for scarce medical resources, and for establishing moral grounds for lower priority more generally. One point to make is that this now needs to make up part of the epistemic conditions (listed above): one must be aware that being callous and indifferent to others will be taken to be relevant to the decision-making processes about who will have access to scarce medical resources. (Perhaps this could be added to the labels on alcoholic beverages as well).
We may be able to establish cases where such failure of moral character has occurred.
Yet, it ought not to be assumed that everyone that asks for a transplantable liver and that meets the causal and epistemic conditions is necessarily wicked. There could be reasons why one is asking for the new liver, even though one meets the causal and epistemic conditions, but that do not necessarily indicate wickedness of character. Perhaps they are deeply remorseful, but their desire to stay alive for their children's sake (say) is overpowering. Or perhaps they have good reason to believe that their staying alive will have very significant benefit to society (e.g. since they are on the brink of curing a devastating disease). In addition to this, there are important (presently unanswered) questions about whether the wickedness that is necessary for disqualifying someone from having equal access to scarce life-prolonging medical resources needs to be a stable character trait, and presented without cowardliness, and displayed without repudiation, etc. Perhaps asking for the liver is an uncharacteristically callous act on behalf of this particular person. We may not think that performing one wicked act in one's life makes one a wicked person, or that a proportional response to one act of wickedness is to sentence that person to death. Or perhaps this person is deeply afraid of dying prematurely, and so they are cowardly rather than wicked; their request for a new liver stems from their cowardliness rather than any real presence of callous disregard and indifference to the plight of others-in which case we would need to show that such cowardliness is sufficient grounds for lower priority or disqualification. Or perhaps one is being wicked but also vows to repudiate. Thus, wickedness of character cannot be assumed, but rather must be demonstrated, and we need a fuller understanding of the role of wickedness in this context than is currently available.
There are more serious problems with this basis for attempting to justify lower priority, which emerge as a rejuvenated problem with establishing causal responsibility. Even if it is true that all people that meet the causal and epistemic conditions for being morally responsible for their ARESLD are wicked people (which I have suggested cannot merely be assumed to be the case), more needs to be established in order for giving them a lower priority to be morally justified. Given the importance of causal responsibility in this context (at least according to Glannon and Brudney) , in the sense of whether someone could have done otherwise, it seems that we would need to ask whether Brudney's callously indifferent organ requester is sufficiently responsible for their being wicked; one must be responsible for one's wicked character, it seems, in order to be causally responsible for the accompanying moral failing; one is not negligent insofar as one could not have done (or been) otherwise. If one were asking for a liver out of a wicked character, but one is not responsible for having that wickedness of character, then it would seem unfair to deny that person's request because of their wicked character. This would be to hold them responsible and blameworthy for something out of their control-something that Glannon and Brudney are both reluctant to do, as evidenced by their emphasis on causal responsibility for alcoholic behavior, for example.
Contemporary empirical research suggests that we can no longer merely assume that people are sufficiently in control of their moral character. For example, situationism challenges the idea that character is strong and stable, and shows that it is susceptible to outside influences, often even quite subtle cues unbeknownst to the agent, which can have significant impacts on the manifest 'character' one displays (Doris 1998; Vargas 2013) . Moreover, what makes someone have a particular kind of character is still quite poorly understood, and there are a number of possible causes of/influences towards wickedness of character: there could be genetic components and predispositions at play; wickedness could be learned during upbringing or ingrained by unsavory parental and other social influences early in life; wickedness may be environmentally or contextually triggered; wickedness could be influenced by background firings in the brain, etc. Importantly, given that wickedness of character in a particular individual could have any or all of these origins, it cannot be assumed that someone's wickedness was sufficiently avoidable or sufficiently under their control, so as to make them responsible for their being wicked. In other words, it seems plausible to suggest that, under certain (perhaps rare) circumstances, a wicked person could not have been otherwise than wicked. Because of this, and in order to determine whether that person is morally responsible for their ARESLD, we need to be able to determine in practice whether specific individuals are responsible for their character, on a case by case basis, something that will be very difficult to do.
Brudney may suggest that we are not denying the wicked person the liver because of their wickedness. Rather, we are justified in giving them a lower priority because they meet the causal and epistemic conditions; we are using their wickedness of character as an explanation to them for why their request for the liver is misplaced, and thus why we are justified in turning down that request.
Even assuming that the problems raised earlier can be overcome, one way to respond to this is to say that it is not (just) the wickedness of the request that is at issue here, but rather the callous disregard for the plight of others at the time(s) when decisions were made about beginning and continuing voluntary action towards ARESLD. It is only wicked to request a scarce transplantable liver if one meets all of the causal and epistemic conditions that began the causal history and which led to ARESLD, for if one is not causally responsible and/or has not met the epistemic conditions, then (presumably) it is not wicked to make such a request for a new liver: one has not behaved wickedly because one has not behaved negligently, because one either could not have done otherwise or cannot be reasonably assumed to have been able to know any better. This means that in order for the wickedness of character to play a moral, justificatory role, it must have been present enough throughout the causal history leading up to that person now being in need of a liver transplant; if the wickedness was not present, then the individual would have been persuaded to stop drinking in light of the knowledge that they have (e.g. that their drinking to the point of ARESLD puts other peoples' lives at stake), or else they did not have sufficient control over their will so as to be able to stop drinking, in which case they would not be causally responsible. During the deliberative process about whether to continue to drink one's liver to death, or in one's decision about whether to ignore or take seriously the knowledge one has about the impacts of one's drinking behavior on oneself and others, it is the wickedness of character that was the driver towards ARESLD for which one is genuinely responsible (rather than towards behavioural reform). In this sense, being wicked plays a causal role in continuing that (sufficiently voluntary) behavior towards ARESLD. For Brudney's argument for the moral justifiability of giving ARESLD people lower priority to go through, then, it needs to be determined whether someone's wickedness of character is something for which they are responsible, which is necessary for determining whether they are causally (and thus morally) responsible for their ARESLD (and subsequent request for a scarce transplantable liver). If we could not determine whether someone could have reasonably been otherwise than being wicked, then it seems as though we cannot establish whether that individual is morally responsible for being in the situation that they find themselves in now. This means that we would not have demonstrated that giving this person a lower priority is morally justifiable. While I do not mean to rule out this possibility, there is good reason to suggest that we do not yet know enough about the causes of character to be able to make any non-speculative conclusions in this regard-pending much more empirical research. Moreover, I for one am skeptical about whether those making the decisions about access to transplantable livers would have enough information, resources and appropriate expertise available to be able to reliably determine the nature of the moral character of individual patients, on a case by case basis.
Conclusion
There are serious problems with mainstream attempts at justifying giving those responsible for their ARESLD lower priority for transplantable livers. This is not to conclude that such attempts cannot be revised so as to establish more plausible grounds for making the prioritization recommendations that they do. Rather, the grounds for such justifiability have yet to be demonstrated, and will likely be very difficult to implement and gauge in practice (even if they can be established). For, in order to accomplish this in practice, medical professionals/transplant teams would require the resources and tools for accurately determining (on a case by case basis) whether a particular individual is (1) causally responsible for their end stage liver disease, (2) meets all of the (now expanded) epistemic conditions at the time when their ARESLD causal history began, which is necessary for establishing moral responsibility, (3) is not fulfilling their imperfect moral duty to not increase the competition for scarce medical resources in other ways, and that the ways in which they are breaching this duty are unacceptable, (4) they are wicked (i.e. callously detached from and indifferent to the plight of others), and (5) their wickedness of character is sufficiently in their control so as to make them blameworthy for having it. Only then does it seem that we could know whether that person is causally and morally responsible for their end stage liver disease, and does not deserve to have equal access as others that are not causally and morally responsible for their being in need.
